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NOTES AND COMMENT
share under the treaty, it is doubtful whether the surrogate has the
right to impound the money. If the German representative appears
with an assignment, valid on its face, it is doubtful whether the surro-
gate would be legally justified in retaining the money.
The statute, of course, is not restricted to dictatorship. It may
also apply to democracies or to any other form of government, as long
as the conditions prescribed by the statute appear.
ROBERT B. F. GILLESPIE.
DUAL JOB HOLDING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM.
Although statutory and common law interdictions against the
holding of multiple public positions have long been an accepted part
of our jurisprudence, it was only recently that such limitations were
extended to inctmbents in the public school system.
For some time the Board of Education has sought to limit teach-
ers to one position, but it has, to a large extent, been frustrated by the
tenure statutes.' These laws provide that a person, who has secured
tenure thereunder, may not be removed except for cause, after hear-
ing, and by the vote of a majority of the Board.2 What constitutes
good and sufficient cause has been the subject of much controversy.$
I In Hughes v. Board of Education of City of New York, 249 App. Div.
158, 291 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1st Dept. 1936), the board of education sought to
remove the principal of an evening school after he had secured tenure, during
his good behavior and competent service and while night school was being
maintained, simply because he held the position of principal of a night school.
In reversing the removal the court said that the board had power to grant the
permanent tenure, and having done so it could not remove the petitioner except
for cause, after hearing and by the vote of a majority of the board. A similar
result was reached in Matter of Cohen v. Board of Education, 163 Misc. 638,
296 N. Y. Supp. 522, aft'd, 277 N. Y. 519, 13 N. E. 454 (1938).2 N. Y. ED. LAW § 872, subd. 3: "* * * Such person and all others employed
in the teaching, examining or supervising service of the school of a city, who
have served the full probationary period, or have rendered satisfactorily an
equivalent period of service prior to the time this act goes into effect shall hold
their respective positions during good behavior and efficient and competent
service, and shall not be removed except for cause after hearing, by the affirma-
tive vote of a majority of the board."
3 See Cooke v. Dodge, 164 Misc. 78, 82, 299 N. Y. Supp. 257, 262 (1937),
where the court laid down the following rule: "The cause assigned must be
substantial and not shadowy, and that the explanation must be received and
acted upon in good faith and not arbitrarily. To be substantial the cause
assigned must be some dereliction on the part of the subordinate, or neglect of
duty, or something affecting his character or fitness for the position." The
difficulties in applying this rule are obvious.
In Matter of Thomas, 33 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 12 (1925), it was held that
the removal of a teacher pursuant to a rule that a teacher's place should become
vacant on her marriage was improper. Cf. Matter of Weeks, 4 N. Y. St.
Dept. Rep. 605 (1915), where it was held that the absence of a married teacher
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However, it may be regarded as well established in New York that
the mere holding of more than one job is not such cause, and can not
be made the grounds for a dismissal action by the Board.4 Nor can
teachers, and others holding positions with the Board of Education,
be categorized as "office holders" so as to come within the constitu-
tional inhibitions concerning the holding of two public offices.5 A
teacher is an employee and not an office holder.6 Thus, the only way
the Board can effectuate the dismissal of a teacher with tenure, ex-
cluding dismissal for cause, is by completely abolishing the position.7
In 1933 the Legislature, with a view to the alleviation of unem-
ployment among those eligible for teaching positions, and cognizant
of the limitations upon the powers of the Board of Education to assist
in the matter, sought to enhance the Board's powers by enacting an
emergency dual job holding statute, forbidding the holding of more
than one non-regular position.8 This statute, however, although im-
occasioned by pregnancy and maternity does not justify her removal as a
teacher. See Op. ED. DEPT., 52 St. Dept. Rep. 270 (1935); School City of
Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 628, 180 N. E. 471 (1932); 56 C. J. (1932) § 337,
p. 401, n.5.
4 See note 1, supra.
5 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 6 (cited and interpreted in United States v. Mc-
Candless, 147 U. S. 692, 13 Sup. Ct. 465 (1893); N. Y. STATE CONsT. art. III,
§ 7 (cited and construed in People ex rel. Gilchrist v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 535
[1878]); GREATER N. Y. CITY CHARTER §895: "Any person holding office,
whether by election or appointment, who shall, during his term of office accept,
hold or retain any other civil office of honor, trust or emolument under the
government of the United States, * * *, or who shall hold or accept any other
office connected with the government of the city, or who shall accept a seat in
the legislature, shall be deemed thereby to have vacated any office held by him
under the city government; except that the mayor may accept, or may in writing
authorize any other person holding office to accept, a specified civil office, in
respect to which no salary or other compensation is provided. * * *." See also
2 MECHEM, THE LAW OF OFFICES AND OFFICERS (1890) § 427; Note (1935)
10 ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 83.
6 Steinson v. Board of Education, 165 N. Y. 431, 434, 59 N. E. 300, 304
(1901) ("The plaintiff [a teacher] was not an officer but an employee") ; Gelson
v. Berry, 257 N. Y. 551, 178 N. E. 791 (1931).
7 N. Y. ED. LAW § 868, subd. 2, empowers the board "To create, abolish,
maintain and consolidate such positions, divisions, boards of business, as, in its
judgment, may be necessary for the proper and efficient administration of its
work."
This section was applied and construed in the following cases: Matter of
Oldenberg, 43 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 117 (1933) ; Matter of Daley, Ed. Dept.,
49 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 201 (1934); People ex rel. Kaufman v. Board of
Education, 166 App. Div. 58, 151 N. Y. Supp. 585 (1st Dept. 1915) ; Cusack v.
Board of Education, 174 N. Y. 136, 66 N. E. 677 (1903). See also Op. Ed.
Dept., 30 St. Dept. Rep. 154 (1933), where it was said: "A board of education
may abolish a position, the effect being to terminate the services of the incum-
bent, but the board may not use its powers, thus conferred by statute, for the
purpose of dismissing a teacher or other employee who has secured the rights
of tenure and who may not be removed except for cause after hearing."
8 N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 726. "§ 1 It is hereby declared that a temporary
emergency exists with regard to unemployment requiring the enactment of the




portant as indicative of a legislative trend, failed to accomplish its
expressed purpose, namely, the spread of employment. 9 Such failure
may be attributed to a large extent, to the fact that, by its terms, it
is restricted in its application to the holders of more than one non-
regular position,'0 and further, and perhaps more important, it ex-
pressly excludes from its orbit those teachers who have secured tenure
in both positions. Since all those teachers who have not secured
tenure are subject to dismissal without cause," irrespective of any
statute, it would seem that the limitations contained in the Act of 1933
render it for all practical purposes of no particular significance. In
1938 the records of the Board of Education revealed that of 38,000
teachers employed by the Board, approximately 1,200 held more than
one teaching position, some of them holding as many as four; while
some 5,000 teachers were on eligible lists awaiting appointment.' 2
Obviously, further legislation was necessary.
Coudert-Goldberg Bill.
In 1939 the Legislature, pursuant to popular demand, amended
Section 872 of the Education Law by the addition of Subdivision 7
which provides:
"7. Any person who, while an employee of the Board of Edu-
cation in a city of one million inhabitants or more, shall accept,
occupy or retain any other employment or office of emolument
with such board, or who shall occupy or accept any other em-
"§ 3 In a city having a population of one million or more, the board of
education shall, in its discretion, have the power to provide that any person
holding, retaining, or accepting a non-regular position under said board of edu-
cation * * * shall be ineligible for appointment or assignment to any other
non-regular position under the said board of education during such same schoolyear, * * *.
"§ 4 This act shall not be deemed in any wise to increase, decrease, or
vacate the tenure rights, if any, which now exist in respect to any such position
of such non-regular employee."
9 See N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1939, p. 25, col. 8, in which it was reported that
the Mayor had shown that of 36,000 teachers and supervisors in the city school
system, 1,209 held dual job positions, and of these 367 were teachers receiving
$1,000 or more from other positions. Seventy-two were teaching on salaries of
$5,000 or more. There were also 296 teachers getting between $3,000 and
$4,000, who were being paid $500 or more extra. See note 1, supra.
'o N. Y. ED. LAw § 868a, subd. 1: "The term 'regular employee' means an
employee serving at an annual salary and who must become a member of the
retirement association created by, or pursuant to, the laws of the state of
New York."
11 I re McMahon, 49 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. - (1934) ("A teacher may be
dismissed for no cause at all or for any cause during his probationary period").
See Matter of O'Conner v. Emerson, 196 App. Div. 807, 812, 813, 188 N. Y.
Supp. 236, '240 (4th Dept. 1921), where the court said: "There is no vested
right in the position of teacher or principal, or the emoluments thereof, except
as the same may be given in a limited way by some express statute."
22 Hendon v. Board of Education, 281 N. Y. 757, 24 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940).
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ployment or office connected with the state or any civil division
or agency thereof, shall be deemed thereby to have vacated his
original employment or office with such board; except that
the board of education, upon the recommendation of the board
of superintendents, may determine * * * that such person be
permitted to occupy such other employment or office for a
period or periods which shall not exceed one school year in the
aggregate ** ** Such board, upon like recommendation, may
permit and regulate the holding of two non-regular positions
by the same person." 13
This statute, although in keeping with a legislative policy extending
over a period of approximately sixty-six years,' 4 is, in the subject
of its application, novel in this country. In its enactment the Legis-
lature has succeeded in effectuating the purpose expressed in the Act
of 1933. The Coudert Bill not only succeeds in prohibiting the hold-
ing of multiple positions in the public schools, irrespective of the nature
of the holding, but, more important, it prohibits such holding irre-
spective of tenure. The fact that it does violate tenure rights has been
the primary ground of attack in both the cases brought thus far to
subject the statute to a judicial test.'5
In Hendon v. Board of Education,'6 the plaintiff, who had se-
cured double tenure both as a teacher in day school and as a teacher
in night school, and who was removed from the latter position by the
defendant, acting pursuant to the Coudert Law, brought an action to
be reinstated, contending that the tenure statutes extended him a con-
tract, which was impaired by the statute in violation of the Consti-
tution,17 and further, that the said law deprived him of a vested right
partaking of the nature of property.'8 The court dismissed the com-
plaint, apparently disregarding the plaintiff's reference to the case of
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,'9 which would seem to support
his position. An examination of the two cases, however, shows they
are reconcilable.
In the Anderson case, it appeared that the Indiana Legislature,
after having extended tenure to the teachers in the public school sys-
tem, sought to modify the law by omitting from its provisions town-
ship school corporations which were included in the original act. The
United States Supreme Court held the amendment unconstitutional,
in that it impaired the obligations of a contract extended the plaintiff
13 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 771.
14 See N. Y. Laws 1873, c. 335, § 114; N. Y. Laws 1882, c. 410, § 55; N. Y.
Laws 1897, c. 378, § 1549; N. Y. Laws 1901, c. 466, § 1549.
' Hendon v. Board of Education, 281 N. Y. 757, 24 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940),
cited supra note 12; LaPolla v. Board of Education, 172 Misc. 364, 15 N. Y. S.(2d) 149, aff'd, 282 N. Y. 140, - N. E. (2d) - (1940).16281 N. Y. 757, 24 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940).
17 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10.
Is U. S. CoNsT. Art. XIV, § 1; N. Y. STATE Co-xsT. art. I, § 6.
19303 U. S. 95, 58 Sup. Ct. 443 (1938).
[ VOL. 14
NOTES AND COMMENT
by the original tenure act. The Court, however, emphasized the
fact that the pertinent statute was "couched in terms of contract",
that it was the well established policy of the state to bind its instru-
mentalities by contract, and that the statute in issue mentioned the
word "contract" twenty-five times.20 It is to be noted that nowhere
in the New York tenure statutes does the word contract appear, fur-
ther, that it is, apparently, not the policy of New York to extend
statutory contracts.
2 1
In the case of Dodge v. Board of Education, the United States
Supreme Court laid down the following rule:
"In determining whether a law tenders a contract to a
citizen it is of first importance to examine the language of the
statute. If it provides for the execution of a written contract
on behalf of the state the case of an obligation binding upon the
state is clear. Equally clear is the case where the statute con-
firms a settlement of disputed rights and defines its terms.
On the other hand, an act merely'fixing salaries of officers cre-
ates no contract in their favor and the compensation named
may be altered at the will of the legislature. This is true also
of an act fixing the term or tenure of a public officer or an
employee of a state agency. The presumption is that such a
law is not intended to create private contractual or vested
rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the
legislature shall deem otherwise." 22
Applying this rule to the case of Phelps v. Board of Education,23
which involved a question as to the effect of a New Jersey tenure
20 Id. at 105.
21 It has been "frequently reiterated by the courts of this state, that a public
office is not a grant, and that the right to it does not depend upon, or partake
of the nature of a contract." Long v. Mayor, 81 N. Y. 425, 428 (1880). See
also 22 R. C. L. (1918) § 11, p. 379.
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the Florida legislature antici-
pated just such a controversy and made express statutory provisions therefor.
See 2 Fla. Laws 1937, c. 18743, § 11, p. 1147. "All employment under the pro-
visions of this Act shall be subordinate to the right of the legislature to amend
or repeal this act at any time and nothing herein contained shall ever be held,
deemed or construed to confer upon persons employed pursuant to the provisions
thereof, a contract which shall be impaired by the amendment or repeal of
this act."
The reason for this rule and for the policy in New York may, perhaps, be
found in Mial v. Ellington, 134 N. C. 131, 158, 46 S. E. 961, 970 (1903). In
that case the court made an extensive survey of the cases, and epitomized in
the following sentence the salient defects of a contrary decision. "If it is true
that a public office is private property, the state, instead of being sovereign, finds
itself in its efforts to perform its governmental functions bereft of its sover-
eignty, its hands tied, its progress obstructed, for that those whom it has com-
missioned to be her servants have, by grants of parts and parcels of her
sovereignty, become her masters, and converting her commissions into grants,
forbid her to proceed or go forward."
22 302 U. S. 74, 58 Sup. Ct. 98, aff'g, 364 Ill. 547, 5 N. E. (2d) 84 (1936).
23 300 U. S. 319, 57 Sup. Ct. 483 (1935).
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statute, the Supreme Court held that no contract was created. An
inspection of these cases leads to the conclusion that tenure, unless
the.statute granting the same is couched in the peculiar phraseology
of the Indiana statute, means simply freedom from the menace of
being removed at pleasure, or at the whim or caprice of one's su-
periors. It is thus a mere incident of office, like its salary or its dura-
tion, and is not a basis for arguing that one who enjoys tenure is in
office under an inviolable contract.2 4
The second contention in the Hendon case was that the Coudert
Law deprived him of a vested property right without due process of
law. This argument, although seemingly supportable by the fact
that in other professions a licensee is protected by the due process
clause,25 is decidedly against the weight of New York authority. In
People ex rel. Peixotto v. Board of Education 26 the question was
squarely presented to the court, and %the non-vested nature of a
teacher's rights was upheld against the most powerful attack that
could have possibly been made upon it. In that case, the petitioner,
a married woman, had been deprived of her office or employment as
a teacher on no other grounds than that she had been absent from
duty in order to bear a child. In justifying her ouster the court said:
"The legislature could have provided that the relator
might be dismissed for no cause whatever. She had no vested
right in the position of teacher." 27
Although the strong dissents recorded in this case, and the subsequent
criticism leveled against the decision may seem to detract from its
cogency, the principles therein enunciated have too often been re-
peated to admit of argument.2 8
24 "The purpose of the provision of the Teacher's Tenure Act requiring
dismissal charges to be presented at a hearing, was to protect teachers from
arbitrary discrimination by being subjected to unfounded and inadequate
charges." Smith v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 334 Pa. 197, 5 A. (2d) 535
(1939).
25 In People ex rel. Greenberg v. Reid, 151 App. Div. 324, 326, 136 N. Y.
Supp. 428 (3d Dept. 1912), the court said: "While such a license (to practice
dentistry) is not, strictly speaking, either a personal or a property right, it
partakes in a measure of the nature of both * * *
"* * * All the authorities, however, * * * hold that a licensee should be
given notice of the presentation of charges against him and an opportunity to be
heard concerning them."
In City of Rochester v. Falk, 170 Misc. 238, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (1939),
the court said: "It would seem that this right (to drive an auto) on which a
livelihood may rest, may be revoked only by, due process of law." See also
People v. Wilson, 179 App. Div. 416, 166 N. Y. Supp. 211 (3d Dept. 1917).
26212 N. Y. 463, 106 N. E. 307 (1914).
27 Id. at 466, 106 N. E. at 308.
28 In Stetson v. Board of Education, 218 N. Y. 301, 112 N. E. 1045 (1916),
the court laid down the following rule:
"* * * While rights which have vested under and by virtue of a statute
cannot be disturbed by a subsequent statute, the right to teach in the public
schools is not vested and is always subject to regulation at the hands of the
[ VOL. 14
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A more cogent constitutional objection may be found in the fact
that, apparently, the statutory interdiction does not extend to those
engaged in private enterprise, or to professions other than teaching.
It would seem that doctors, lawyers, dentists and accountants, though
licensed as are teachers, may be, and have been, assigned to teach in
night schools. 29 That this exclusion is inconsistent with the avowed
purpose of the statute must be admitted, but whether the statute is
thereby rendered vulnerable to the objection that it denies to teachers
the equal protection of the laws 30 is more difficult to resolve. A rele-
vant case is that of McPherson v. Blacker,31 wherein the court said:
"The inhibition that no state shall deprive any person
within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws was
designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being
singled out as a special subject for discriminatory and hostile
legislation." 32
The statute in issue undoubtedly discriminated between classes and
would, therefore, seem to fall within this rule. However, in subse-
quent cases the rule was to some extent modified or, to be more
exact, particularized. Thus, in Radice v. New York, the United
States Supreme Court, in commenting upon unlawful discrimination,
said:
"Of course, the mere fact of classification is not enough to
put a statute beyond the reach of the equality provision of the
fourteenth amendment. Such classification must not be 'purely
legislature. The general statutes invoked by the appellant, which existed at
the time of the adoption of the Greater N. Y. City Charter, do not invalidate
or render inoperative the charter provisions which the appellant alleges to be
inconsistent with them." See also Conner v. Mayer, 51 N. Y. 285 (1851);
Long v. Mayer, 81 N. Y. 425 (1880) ; Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U. S.
74, 58 Sup. Ct. 98 (1937); Higginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge, 306 U. S.
535, 59 Sup. Ct. 705 (1939).
29 An attorney, although commonly called an officer of the court, cannot be
categorized as a public officer. Thus in In re Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378 (U. S.
1866), Field, J., said: "The profession of an attorney and counsellor is not like
an officer created by an act of congress which depends for its continuance, its
powers and its emoluments, upon the will of its creator, and the possession of
which may be burdened with any conditions not prohibited by the Constitution
* * *." The license is merely a privilege or franchise. Matter of Co-operative
Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910). See also Buxter v. Lietz, 139
N. Y. Supp. 46 (1913).
A license is required from physicians merely to protect the public from
injury which unlearned and unskilled practitioners may cause. Brown v.
Shyne, 242 N. Y. 176, 151 N. E. 197 (1926). See also Note (1926) 44 A. L. R.
1407.
It may thus be seen that any connection these professions may have with
the state is purely for regulatory purposes and not such as to bring them within
the purview of the statute.
30 U. S. CoNsT. Art. XIV, § 1.
33 146 U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 3 (1892).
32 Id. at 39.
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arbitrary, oppressive or capricious' * * *. But the mere
production of inequality is not enough. Every selection of per-
sons for regulation so results, in some degree. The inequality
produced, in order to encounter the challenge of the Consti-
tution, must be 'actually and palpably unreasonable and
arbitrary.' "83
Applying this latter rule it may be observed that the test to be applied
to the instant case is that of reasonableness. Whether any discrim-
ination is reasonable is of course a matter of opinion, but in the in-
stant case the very difficulty of detecting violators in the excluded
classes would, seemingly, suffice to warrant the distinction. But if
this rationalization be specious it would seem that ample authority
to sustain the statute may be found by drawing an analogy to the
dual office holding statutes. These statutes, remarkably similar both
in terminology and effect to the one in issue, have been universally
sustained . 4
Problems in Enforcement.
More often than not, when novel legislation is proposed, the
parties affected raise the cry of "injustice". The instant case pro-
vides no exception, unless it be that the complaints are, to some ex-
tent, logically sound. One of the more cogent objections advanced 8 5
is that under the statute even a night school teacher is restricted to
but one job, and that since by statute night schools are open a maxi-
mum of one hundred nights,8 6 and since the prescribed salary per
night is but four dollars and fifty cents 7 it will be difficult if not
impossible for the Board of Education to obtain teachers to fill the
positions without resorting to those employed in the day time, the
very thing sought to be overcome by the statute. Some factual veri-
fication may be found for this argument in that a lack of non-regular
teachers in trade subjects has already evidenced itself.38 However,
it is submitted that, persuasive though this argument be, it may be
overcome by a strict interpretation of the statute. The statute pro-
vides that: "Such board, upon like recommendation, may permit and
regulate the holding of two non-regular positions by the same per-
son." The courts may construe this to mean that the Board has
absolute discretion in permitting the holding of two non-regular posi-
tions, and that such discretion is not limited by the one-year provi-
sion. Such a holding could be supported by the fact that, although
non-regular teachers would of necessity fall within the general scope
of the statute as set forth in the first sentence, the Legislature deemed
83 264 U. S. 292, 293, 44 Sup. Ct. 325, 326 (1924).
34 See note 5, supra; see also Note (1935) 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 8335 Hendon v. Board of Education, 281 N. Y. 757, 24 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940).36 N. Y. ED. LAW § 872, subd. 3.3 7 N. Y. ED. LAW § 887.
38 N. Y. Sun, Nov. 3, 1939, p. 86, col. 3.
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it necessary to appropriate a separate sentence to them. Assuming,
as we must, that the separation was intentionally and consciously
made,39 it is reasonable to suppose that a distinction was intended,
and that since there is no mention of a one-year period in the pro-
vision covering non-regular teachers, the inapplicability of the said
period to such teachers constitutes the distinction.
It is -to be observed that the statute does not carry the usual
clause excluding from its application notary publics and commis-
sioners of deeds.40 Such persons would seem to be embraced within
the clause "any other office or offices connected with the state or any
civil division or agency thereof", and, therefore, the acceptance by
an incumbent in the public school system of such a position would,
apparently, bring him within the purview of the statute and result in
a vacation of his prior position.41 A like result would, seemingly,
follow the acceptance of the position of proctor for the state or local
civil service commission or the acceptance of membership to an elec-
tion registry board, or of the position of enumerator under the pro-
portional representation system.42 Since the imposition of the statu-
tory penalty upon the holders of these positions will probably aid very
little in effectuating the avowed purpose of the statute, it would seem
that their inclusion was a fortuitous one, rather than one contem-
plated by the Legislature.
Conclusion.
Although regulatory legislation often is productive of inequality,
and always of criticism, it usually has a laudable purpose and a salu-
tary effect. The Coudert-Goldberg Law provides no exception. It
is, in substance, consistent with a judicial and legislative trend ex-
tending over a period of sixty-six years, 43 and there is no reason why
it should prove less effectual than have inhibitions of a similar char-
acter. True, the Legislature failed to anticipate every eventuality,
39 The statute being in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed.
40 See note 14, supra.
41 See People v. Rathbone, 145 N. Y. 434, 40 N. E. 395 (1895), in which the
court held that a notary is a public officer within the constitutional provisions
providing that no public officer should receive any free pass, and that a person
violating the same should be deemed to have vacated his office. A like rule
was laid down in the case of People v. Wadhams, 176 N. Y. 9, 68 N. E. 65(1903).
Since a notary was considered a public officer within the purview of these
regulatory statutes, it follows that he would be considered the holder "of an
office connected with the state" within the inhibition of the Coudert Bill.
For confirmation of this view see Letter from N. Y. City Council to the
Board of Education dated June 30, 1939.
42 Since these positions are analogous to a notary public in that they too
are directly connected with the state in their inception and duties it would seem
that they would also fall within the purview of the Coudert Law. See N. Y.
Corp. Council Letter cited supra note 41.
43 See note 14, supra.
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but such omissions as were made do not detract from either the
validity or the value of the statute. Further, they may be supplied
by amendment.
It is submitted that in order to perfect the statute, and better
effectuate its purpose, the following amendments should be made:
(1) Notary publics, commissioners of deeds and similar public
officers should be expressly excluded from the operation of the stat-
ute. As was pointed out above, the inclusion of this group is mere
supererogation; its exclusion may prevent a possible injustice.
(2) All those who retain outside employment and who derive,
therefrom, an income in excess of a stated amount should be included
within the statutory inhibition. The avowed purpose of the statute
is to alleviate unemployment and to improve the character of teaching
in the public schools. 44  The exclusion of those not employed as day
teachers would seem, to some extent, to defeat this purpose.
JULIUS R. PASCUZZO, JR.
THE LIABILITY OF PARKING LOT OWNERS.
I.
Recently the courts have been confronted with the sometime dif-
ficult problem of determining the exact nature of the legal relationship
existing between the owner of a parking lot and the owner of a car
parked therein.' The cases indicate that the problem has been ade-
quately solved by the courts' determination that the relationship is
either one in the nature of licensor and licensee 2 or that of bailor and
bailee 3 depending upon whether the owner of the car has merely hired
44 Hendon v. Board of Education, 281 N. Y. 757, 24 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940).
1 The problem was presented for the first time in any jurisdiction in Penn-
royal Fair Ass'n v. Hite, 195 Ky. 732, 243 S. W. 1046 (1922). The New York
courts were faced with the problem for the first time in Galowitz v. Magner,
208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept. 1924).2 Ex parte Mobile Light & R. R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924). See
Note (1924) 34 A. L. R. 925. "Cases which have refused to find a bailor-
bailee relationship between car owner and parking lot operator have not specified
the legal relationship existing between them. The two alternatives would be
that of lessor-lessee or that of licensor-licensee." (1924) 18 MINN. L. REv.
352, 353; see (1939) 9 FORTNIGHTLY L. J. 103.
3 Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept.
1924); Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fabian, 170 Misc. 665, 9 N. Y. S. (2d)
1018 (1938) ; Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, 109 Cal. App. 715, 293 Pac.
821 (1930) ; Crawford v. Hall, 56 Ga. App. 122, 192 S. E. 231 (1937) ; Keenan
Hotel Co. v. Funk, 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N. E. 364 (1931); Downs v. Sley
System Garages, 129 Pa. 68, 194 Atl. 772 (1937) ; see Jones, The Parking Lot
Cases (1938) 27 GEo. L. J. 162; Notes (1934) 14 B. U. L. REv. 368; (1939)
37 MIcH. L. REv. 468; (1932) 30 MIcE. L. REv. 614.
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